

that the effect on the Catholic voter has been worth while.

In one way, but more likely only in a narrow sense, National's judgment has been sound. Emotionally and materially the private school issue has been of deep significance to Catholics for generations, particularly since the 1877 Education Act, and after spending so many millions of pounds, Catholics experience any form of relief as a small share of the justice which they consider their due. National's offer will therefore have been translated, also via the pulpit and Catholic publications, into some solid gains.

Yet, in the long run it may not be wise for Labour to try and outbid on this issue. Not only because Catholics are only a 14% minority of the population, but because more Catholics, especially with large families, are realizing that the erosion of the Welfare State under National balances badly against the superficially attractive rebates from school fees and church collections which favour people on high incomes. Large Catholic families are feeling the pinch of the reduced value of medical and family benefits and are beginning to wake up to National's play with their sensitivity about the Catholic schools issue.

But more important fundamentally are the signs that Catholics themselves are subjecting the whole question of Catholic education to some up-to-date criticism. Secularism is no longer a bogey of the past, less so since those who embraced it as a creed on its own are now few and far between. Some Catholics are becoming aware that, although their private faith is well protected and fostered in Catholic institutions of learning, Catholicism is unlikely to flourish in a ghetto atmosphere or by being alienated from that world that has developed since the Reformation.

Since the influence of Teilhard de Chardin and Pope John the whole process of scientific and social evolution has acquired a new Christian meaning for Catholics and this, in future, cannot fail to affect traditional attitudes on the question of private Catholic schools. The old cries of 'justice' and 'equal rights' will probably not be heard again with the same force; a number of priests and laymen have never shared the sentiments with which they were voiced anyhow.

One may presume that in years to come there may well be opportunities for a practical as well as an ideological rapprochement between Catholic and State education and it may be wiser for Labour's long term planners to take the development of Catholic thought into account rather than to outbid National on a course that will lead to further apartheid and corresponding educational privileges for the few.

The Present

Fighting Asians on Asian soil as the result of National's notions behind foreign policy may soon cause a reduction in the education vote which has risen remarkably during the last years, even allowing for inflationary policies. There is evidence, however, that a disproportionate share of the money is flowing into the pockets of contractors and sub-contractors of schoolbuildings, booksellers and other suppliers of educational materials whose incomes usually seem to be well above that of most schoolteachers. Among teachers themselves there seems to be a great deal of well intentioned preoccupation with individual children at the expense of the larger group which is throwing much of the educational process at primary level out of balance.

In this connection it is curious indeed to see people in pro-

gressive circles, courageous fighters for many good causes, adhere to education theories with their origin in laissez faire individualism of past centuries. It was under this inspiration that examinations were at one stage (during the French Revolution) entirely abolished and students of the New Zealand education system may find it an interesting intellectual exercise to trace the abolition of the proficiency examination, the institution of accrediting and its stubborn retention by school principals, as well as the campaign for the abolition of School Certificate, (so strangely backed by one of New Zealand's leading economists) to pre-Marxian ideological concepts, notably those of Jean Jacques Rousseau.

The demands of modern education for a technological age are likely to involve more and better, not fewer, examinations conducted under conditions that ensure conformity to high national standards, not the subjective notions of small groups of teachers who cannot hope to avoid anomalies, temptations and injustices. Many teachers would share this criticism, but their ability to change the system is not great, since Headmasters and Principals possess a disproportionate amount of influence in the relevant deliberations.

Interwoven with this resistance to change is the ideological network of the Education Department with its capacity of friendly, but effective disapproval of the dissenter and its tempting rewards for those who are loyal to the cause.

None of these remarks should be allowed to distract the reader's attention from the main issues involved in this year's election. The National Party will again offer voting incentives to the electorate connected with education. This is part of the game of politics and to play the game in favour of a privileged minority is traditionally the task of the National Party. It uses considerable skills towards this purpose for which it is prepared to pay and pay well, with results that have often been in proportion to the sums invested. This too is regrettably part of the game of politics. In reply Labour should field its own experts to examine, analyse and criticize the present education system to provide improvements consistent with the interests of the whole community to whose wellbeing and advancement the party is traditionally and truthfully committed.

Elsie Locke

We, the Accusers?

TWENTY years after the end of World War II, on August 19, 1965, seventeen men were sentenced by a Frankfurt court for their share in the mass murder of some four million people by the Nazis at the infamous camp of Auschwitz.

The Reuter cable reported:

'Allegations of torture, shooting, hanging, deadly injections and gassing became commonplace as the trial, expected to last only six months, stretched out to 20 months. . . .

The presiding judge rejected the argument that the "small fry" of the mass murder bureaucracy who were on trial were not guilty because they did not plan the crimes.

"They were just as necessary to carry out the crime as those who planned it at their desks," he said."

The judge would undoubtedly have the endorsement of the section of world opinion which has followed the long tragic tale of war crimes through the trials at Nuremberg, in the USSR and throughout Central Europe, and in Israel. The excuse is not accepted that

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the defendants were only carrying out the orders of the State. Our revulsion is all the greater when this follows the cold-blooded ordering of Jews to the slaughter-house, the shovelling of corpses to specially-built crematoria, the torture and humiliation practised on the living inmates—that men could do this as a job of work and go home afterwards, to a home-life with families and friends.

Adolf Eichmann shrank from looking at the executions he ordered, and saved his sanity by not facing the end result of his actions. Those whose jobs were more direct and menial were in some cases diverted enough to gain a sadistic satisfaction. More often, it seems, they were conditioned to regard their victims as of a species different from themselves.

This is a virus which, once it has penetrated the human outlook, makes permissible any inhumanity—and it is not peculiar to the Germans under the infestation of Nazism.

The Irish have not forgotten Oliver Cromwell, that upright puritan and affectionate family man, who once ordered the total massacre of all men, women and children in Drogheda. In Cromwell's eyes, they were only Irish, and Catholics to boot—not human enough to count.

What happened at Sarafand

When in New Zealand we suffered a shock at the revelation, through the publication of the book *Armageddon* by Captain Cyril Falls, of what happened at Sarafand in Palestine towards the close of World War I.³ The main facts revealed were borne out by the official Australian history of the war⁴ (although effectively disguised in our own); and eye-witness comments in our newspapers varied in their interpretations, but did not dispute the story.

The Australian and New Zealand soldiers were fed up with petty sneiving around their camps by Arab villagers. When a New Zealander awoke to find an Arab pulling at the bag which served him as a pillow, he leapt up to pursue the intruder and was shot dead. In reprisal, the diggers surrounded the village of Sarafand and demanded the murderer; and some time later they passed out the women and children, and proceeded to slaughter the men. 'There were sixty-one Arab men dead,' admitted an ex-digger in our press. 'I now. I helped to lay them out.'

The explanation offered was that it was high time the thieves were taught a lesson. Lieut.-Col. C. Guy Powles in New Zealand's official History actually wrote that 'many messages were received from Jewish settlers and senior officers of other formations that his disturbance would have a very good effect on the natives.'⁵ No one seems to have commented that this was the Arabs' country, that our soldiers were there without the villagers' invitation and that petty thefts were not unconnected with desperate poverty. So drastic a lesson could only occur when there was no true human contact between the soldiers and the Arabs. Given the utter contempt which can regard an Arab peasantry as less than human, anything is possible.

The Story of Lidice

The story is reminiscent of Lidice, the village in Czechoslovakia which was accused of harbouring the slayer of the Nazi gauleiter, Heydrich; for which 'crime' the women were taken to concentration camps, the men shot and the village razed. But there is one important difference. In Lidice this was not an impulsive action spurred on by exasperation and ignorance. The reprisals were carried out by official order and in cold blood.

How could the German people allow Lidice to happen? How could they allow the death camps to begin and to continue?

It is easy for us to stand outside and ask questions when we were in no way involved; but less simple in matters of social conscience which involve ourselves.

War between armies has long passed the stage where it concerns only the combat armies. In World War I, we accepted the fact that bombs and shells must kill a high proportion of civilians. In World War II, we went further.

How many British people realize, to this day, that it was the deliberate policy of their Government to break the spirit of German resistance by the obliteration bombing of residential areas in German cities?

This is something which the Germans themselves did not do. No doubt, of course, this was more from good sense than from morals; for, as Professor P. M. S. Blackett has written:

'The only major campaign in modern history in which the traditional military doctrine of waging war against the enemy's armed forces was abandoned for a planned attack on its civilian life, was a disastrous flop.'⁶ With wiser use of Britain's resources, he added, the war might have finished half a year earlier.

The destruction of Dresden

What the policy meant in real life is described by David Irving in his book *The Destruction of Dresden*. There were no important military targets in this ancient and beautiful city, which was undefended. Indeed, it was considered 'safe' to the extent that its pre-war population of 633,000 was outnumbered by perhaps a million refugees streaming westward before the Russian advance.

Using a technique that had already been tested in Hamburg, the Air Force, in less than half an hour, sowed its incendiary bombs in such a way as to create a fire-storm; that is, a concentration of heat sufficient to induce a violent up-draught which in its turn brought winds of gale force rushing inwards, to continually widen the circle of fire—and to suck living people into the flames. Those who escaped to the parks were given attention in a second attack three hours later, when the outskirts were also touched up with a new round of incendiaries.⁷

The inferno of Dresden in which 135,000 people perished can now be remembered in Britain as a badge of shame.

But Dresden was the result of a Government policy. Who was responsible for it? And why was it permitted to continue for three long years?

The inside story has been told by two scientists personally involved: C. P. Snow in his book *Science and Government*, and P. M. S. Blackett in *Studies of War*. It is documented in the official 4-volume history by Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive*.⁸

The decision rested with a very small circle of political leaders, scientists and military men, at the centre of whom were Winston Churchill and Lord Cherwell. Official jargon is always good at blurring the picture of what a decision means in human terms; but it leaves no doubt in this case that human beings, not military installations were the actual targets.

Take for example this minute addressed by Sir Charles Portal (Chief of the Air Staff) to Air Vice-Marshal Bottonley on 15 February 1942: 'Re the new bombing directive. I suppose it is clear that the aiming points are to be the built-up areas, *not*, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories. This must be clear if it is not already understood.'⁹

There is a long minute by Lord Cherwell sent to Winston Churchill as Prime Minister on 30 March, 1942:

'The following seems to be a simple method of estimating what we could do by bombing Germany. Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, one ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20-40 dwellings and turns 100-200 people out of house and home. We know from our experience that we can count on nearly 14 operations sorties per bomber produced. The average lift of the bombers we are going to produce over the next 15 months will be about 3 tons. It follows that each of these bombers will in its lifetime drop about 40 tons of bombs. If these are dropped on built-up areas they will make 4000-8000 people homeless.

'In 1938 over 22 million Germans lived in 58 towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, which, with modern equipment, should be easy to find and hit. Our forecast output of heavy bombers (including Wellingtons) between now and the middle of 1943 is about 10,000. If even half the total load of 10,000 bombers were dropped on the built-up areas of those 58 German towns, the great majority of their inhabitants (about one-third of the German population) would be turned out of house and home.

Investigation seems to show that having one's house demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends and relatives killed. At Hull signs of strain were evident, though only one-tenth of the houses were demolished. On the above figures we should be able to do ten times as much harm to each of the 58 principal German towns. There seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people. Our calculation assumes, of course, that we really get one-half of our bombs into built-up areas.'¹⁰

The conclusion was inevitably drawn that it was best to concentrate on the working-class suburbs, where the density was greatest.

Top Secret

All this was top secret at the time. The British public, and with it the New Zealand public, had no notion that the bombing was deliberately diverted from military targets onto the civilians themselves. Awkward questions were asked in the House of Commons, and answered by those outright lies which are considered honourable in war-time.

When in 1942 an independent Labour MP asked whether the RAF had been instructed 'to impede and disorganize the German effort by the destruction of workmen's dwellings', Sir Archibald Sinclair, who was Secretary of State for Air, replied that no instruction had been given to destroy dwelling-houses rather than armament factories.¹¹ Mr Richard Stokes, who campaigned consistently against the area offensive, was similarly answered after Dresden:

'We are not wasting bombers on purely terror tactics. It does not do the hon. member justice to come here to this House and suggest that there are a lot of Air Marshals or pilots or any one else sitting in a room trying to think how many German women and children they can kill.'¹²

This was precisely what had happened Winston Churchill failed to note such a small point in his Memoirs, but he admitted it bluntly in a minute of 28 March, 1945:

'It seems to me that the moment has come when the bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretences should be reviewed.'¹³

After Dresden the Bishop of Chichester, the Rt. Rev. G. K. A. Bell, rose in the House of Lords. He referred to the joint declaration made at the beginning of the war by the British and French Governments, that it was their intention to spare civilians and to preserve, in every way possible, treasured monuments and human achievements; and he now challenged this attack upon Dresden as a betrayal of that pledge, being aimed at non-combatant, non-military and non-industrial objectives. The Government's reply was short, simple and a model of evasion—that the targets had been chosen with a definite view to making it more difficult for the Germans and their allies to carry on the war.¹⁴

Dr Bell's protest appears to be the only one to break through the cables into the New Zealand press. From the cabled reports of the raid itself, none could have guessed what really happened. True, there were a few lines from a Swedish source: 'When the city was raided, all cinemas, churches and schools were crowded with women, children and aged persons taking refuge from the east'¹⁵—but by this time, readers were accustomed to the daily recital of distressing stories.

There is an additional terrible irony in David Irving's revelation that the bombing of Dresden was in fact queried by some highly-placed officers, but approved for political reasons. In February 1945 the defeat of Germany had entered its final stages. The politicians were busy with the preparations for diplomatic battles over the post-war settlements. The raid was partly intended to impress the Russians immediately before Churchill and Truman were to meet Stalin at Yalta. Because of weather conditions, it was delayed until Yalta was already ten days in the past—but nobody called off the raid.

From the military viewpoint there was no gain whatever. Professor Blackett is very clear on this point.

'Without any doubt the area-bombing offensive was an expensive failure. About 500,000 German men, women and children were killed, but in the whole bombing offensive 160,000 United States and British airmen, the best young men of both countries, were lost. German war production went on rising steadily until it reached its peak in August 1944. At this time the Allies were already in Paris and the Russian armies were well into Poland. German civilian morale did not crack.'¹⁶

The British authorities should have known that it never does. Lord Cherwell's superficial observations of Hull were surely contradicted by the courage of London. Terror tactics do not make people amenable; they produce a furious determination to resist, and to hit back as soon as possible. (By the same token, the professed intention of the United States to force North Vietnam to the conference table by the weight of her bombs must reflect either colossal ignorance or deliberate concealment of other motives.)

The Americans ended the war by adding the final outrage—the dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This took us by surprise as it did the Japanese, and its significance did not sink in for a long time. Among those who *were* in the know, there

were bitter debates as to whether the bomb should be used on a living city or demonstrated in some harmless way. The standard excuse is that the use of an unanswerable weapon forced Japan to surrender and saved more lives than it cost. This excuse, even if acceptable, cannot possibly be applied to the second bomb. The example had already been made, and Nagasaki was a needless sacrifice.

But by this time, humane considerations had been eroded by six years of war. As in the much simpler case of the unplanned outrage at Sarafand, the victims were not thought of as human beings with any particular rights in the matter. The far-reaching consequences of these new ways of war were scarcely perceived in the hurrahs of victory.

Who is responsible?

The British and American peoples have no guilt for the ovens of Auschwitz. The presence in their territories of thousands of Jewish refugees has given realism to the tragedy and highlighted the question, asked frequently over these twenty years, of how the German people could possibly have allowed the death camps to come into existence. There is no similar searchlight on the 130,000 citizens who were cremated just as needlessly and brutally at Dresden; and no headline for the people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who are still dying after years of suffering. If, reading of the Nazi concentration camps, we ask why the employees did not refuse to carry out the beating and the murders, why nobody denounced the policy in audible terms, we should in all honesty ask some questions of ourselves.

The area bombing offensive was carried out by thousands of airmen and civilians among whom many must have divined its true purpose. Why did not even one of them—to the best of our knowledge—say No?

They were under orders? There was a war on? There was nothing effective they could do? If they didn't, some one else would?

These are precisely the answers given by the Nazi underlings.

We step here into the dilemma which has been debated ever since human beings came together in human society. Which is to have the first call on our allegiance: the authority that rules us, or the prompting of our conscience?

If each individual may decide which laws he will obey, and which orders he will carry out, then law and order become impossible. But, if obedience is insisted upon regardless of a man's conviction of what is right, then a tyranny has no possible check on the commission of its crimes, even to the destruction of society itself.

The answer lies in a balance evolved in the development of a society. In the British tradition, the rule of law is qualified by civil liberties which have taken centuries to establish, and which owe their origin to rebels who refused to toe a line which they considered unjust. Generally speaking we cling to these liberties with determination and jealousy, but in wartime the ordinary citizen is prepared to yield them up and let authority reign supreme. He knows that he cannot obtain the facts to make his own judgment on many questions, and he adopts the position expected of a soldier: Yours not to reason why, yours but to do or die. The minority of sceptics and rebels is derived from those with challenging views in advance of the war, and those who undergo some unique experience as the war proceeds.

Many people really enjoy this removal of individual responsibility, and a sense of a whole nation moving together in face of danger and adversity. It remains only too easy to carry this wartime attitude over into peacetime conditions, and to brush off personal obligations with the assurance that the Government knows best. In wartime the democratic processes have little chance to check the follies and the inhumanities of Governments. There is no point in democracy if, in normal peacetime conditions, we do not even try.

Society has grown very complex. The citizen is remote from the final decisions, and even if he cultivates his social outlook it is very easy to be fooled. The enormity that can grow from a small beginning is difficult to grasp unless there is some prior example, which can only be recognized with some degree of historical knowledge and perspective.

In Nazi Germany, discrimination against the Jews began in a relatively minor way. Many good people did not mind very much when the Jews were driven out of their colleges and their synagogues and their businesses; they were even prepared to applaud it, as far as it went. They would have risen in horror at the sugges-

ion of total extermination. The thing stole upon them piece by piece, and when it had become genocide it was too late. The citizens were now conditioned to accept it; or obsessed with their own personal safety; or overwhelmed by their own helplessness; or blind to the plain facts—even, worst of all, infected by the virus of sadistic cruelty. The few who might have chosen to act could find no avenue for effective action.

New Zealand and Apartheid

New Zealand is not under fascism. We are an educated people with the money and the time to procure the sources of information. We have not much excuse if we allow ourselves to be drawn into the cruelty and injustice which rampages through the world.

As a nation we take some pride in our enlightenment on the race question. Officially we accept the principle that all peoples, regardless of colour, must share the earth in mutual respect. By law we apply this principle to Maori and pakeha, and with official blessing many people are working towards making the partnership real and universal in practice.

Yet, when it comes to the acid test, we have this year put a stamp of approval upon the policy of apartheid in South Africa. The Student Anti-Apartheid Committee which stood vigil in a wild southerly all night before the gates of Lancaster Park before the Third Rugby Test, put its case in a small leaflet:

'If a national team is not made up of the best possible sportsmen available it ceases to be a truly national team. The visiting Springboks do not represent the sixteen million people of South Africa, but those three million of them who happen to have been born white. To pretend that the visiting Rugby team is of representative and test status is to treat thirteen million non-white South Africans as if they did not exist.'

Voices were raised by the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) in Auckland, by some Church leaders, by Maori MP's M. Rata and Sir Eruera Tirikatene and others. They were out-numbered hundreds of times over by the crowds pressing into the football grounds.

Most of these people had not given apartheid a thought, and were visibly puzzled at the sight of a demonstration. A few had reached the genuine opinion that it was best to show the Springboks how racial equality works among Maori and pakeha. The remaining consciences were drilled to fit in with the enjoyment of a rousing top-level match.

Into this mood rolled the brutal speeches of Prime Minister Verwoerd and Senator de Klerk designed to shatter any illusion produced by the cheerful words of Dr Danie Craven: there could be no Maoris in any team touring South Africa so long as apartheid lasted.

The mood of the country from the Prime Minister downwards was immediately—Very well then, no tour in 1967. The Rugby leaders kept a poker face in the spirit of 'everything will be decided at the proper time'. As soon as the shock subsided, the softening-up process began. Isn't any sort of team better than none at all? The Maoris won't really mind, it's better to show friendship to South Africa, and so on, and so on.

We have not even the excuse of ignorance and lack of imagination (by which most New Zealanders do not see the cruelty and injustice of apartheid) if we again allow the excitement of a game to override the principles of our national life. We cannot have it both ways. The welcome given to the all-white Springbok team was tied in with the idea that the choice was South Africa's affair and that to object was to meddle in politics. Any all-white New Zealand team sent in the future would be to hand Dr Verwoerd the choice for New Zealand also; the dictation of apartheid to our country which specifically rejects apartheid.

Two years are left in which to test the national conscience against the enticements of pleasure and profit in the national sport.

Involvement in Vietnam

The professed intention of a nation's policy which appears neat enough at home can look entirely different when seen from the overseas ground where it actually operates. This is true of our involvement in the Vietnam war, ostensibly by invitation of the South Vietnamese Government but openly as an endorsement of United States' policy. Not many South-East Asians can believe that the big forces of the USA and the tiny ones of New Zealand are really present in their local interest. In fact, our Governments in the

last analysis do not pretend that they are. More than a year ago the real reasons were frankly stated to a Japanese audience by Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy:

'We believe it essential in the interests of the free world that South Vietnam shall not be permitted to fall under Communist control. If it does, then the rest of South-East Asia will be in grave danger of progressively disappearing behind the Bamboo Curtain, and other Asian countries like India and in time Australia and your own nation will in turn be threatened. If Hanoi and Peiping prevail in Vietnam in this key test . . . then the Communists will use this technique with growing frequency elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America.'¹⁷

The point was not omitted from the New Zealand White Paper justifying our intervention:

'To demonstrate that the Communists will not be allowed a military victory will be of the utmost importance to the future peace and stability of the whole area. In this sense the present conflict in Vietnam seems likely to be a turning point, one way or the other, in the history of Asia, with all the implications this has for New Zealand's future security.'¹⁸

In short, we are killing Vietnamese and dictating what sort of Government they shall not have, in order to save ourselves from the Chinese dragon, real or imagined. The immorality of this procedure is clouded by our own tradition, that we defend this country by sending an expeditionary force somewhere else. It's the same thing all over again, in the view of many supporters of our Government policy towards Vietnam.

The fiction that we are present by the desire of the South Vietnamese Government binds us to a solid fact—that the war will be fought in the fashion prescribed by the South Vietnamese officers and their American 'advisers'. This is an extraordinarily brutal fashion. It includes the use of napalm, phosphorus, the 'lazy dog' and the Armalite rifle (close relation to the outlawed dum-dum bullet); the chemical destruction of crops and forests; the deliberate burning of stocks of rice; the bombing of irrigation works at the Red River; the herding of people into concentration camps re-titled 'strategic hamlets'; and the burning of villages on suspicion of harbouring the Viet Cong. All these are given the usual justifications of precedent and of modern efficiency.

Then what about the use of physical torture to extract information from captured men, women and children?

The English-speaking peoples are supposed to have finished with all that, centuries ago. The Tower of London is kept as a Museum to emphasize that those were the bad old days. In 1965, week after week our newspapers carry photographs that have clearly come through American sources, and often show Americans standing by to watch the torture being inflicted. It is beside the point that similar actions are reported from the other side. We have no control over what they do, but we *are* responsible for what our allies do, if we give them effective support in the commission of their crimes. We ought to ask ourselves bluntly what sort of war we have got into, if we find ourselves providing moral support to these inhuman practices.

The gunners had been in Vietnam only a few weeks when they were directly concerned in the destruction of villages. Our first casualties were promptly 'revenged' by the execution of two guerrillas taken by South Vietnamese soldiers in the vicinity of the land mine which killed them. This produced an immediate reaction from the New Zealand Ex-Prisoners of War Association, which asked that any prisoners taken be treated according to the Geneva Convention. Although unanimously behind the sending of troops, the Association did not agree to any inhuman acts against prisoners which could cause grave repercussions.¹⁹ Its spokesmen saw, of course, that New Zealanders taken prisoner could expect the same treatment; underlined by the news only a few days later, that the Viet Cong had executed two American captives.

Up till this time the Minister of Defence, Hon. D. J. Eyre, had remained evasive when asked about the Geneva Convention, but on September 29 Mr Holyoake told Parliament that our forces were under strict instructions to enforce its rules. He added that similar statements had been made by the Governments of the United States, Australia and South Vietnam in assurances to the International Red Cross, although the other side had so far failed to do so.²⁰ No attempt was made to face the wider implications of the executions; that the captives were being treated not as combatants but as rebels, and that therefore we are concerned in putting down a rebellion. To admit this would be to give the game away,

that New Zealand is (despite official statements) interfering in a civil war. Though ostensibly defending the South from North Vietnamese aggression, we are not even legally at war with North Vietnam.

If the promise to uphold the Geneva Convention owes something to the pressure of the Ex-Prisoners of War Association, and no doubt less publicized pressure from other quarters, then where is the pressure against the use of torture? Do we feel that this doesn't concern the New Zealand unit and therefore doesn't concern us? The newspapers publish the photographs and reports in a distant 'no comment' atmosphere. Perhaps we are expected to shrug our shoulders and say, well that's war, these people aren't like us, and the other side does it too, it's out of our hands, and so on, and so on?

The shadow of the guards at Auschwitz, and the neighbours who saw the smoke rising and said nothing, is over our quiet country, School children studying current affairs may hardly realize that such barbarity would have aroused a furious abhorrence in a more gentle age, which their grandparents can remember.

'This is a ghastly jungle war, and people are acting like animals both in the jungle and in the political power struggle which is expressed in the jungle warfare.' Thus wrote the Rev. Alan Brash to the New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, from his nearby post with the World Council of Churches in Singapore. Is New Zealand to descend to the jungle without a word of protest? Or can we find some practical expression to the advice of Rev. Brash: 'Hang on to your care for human beings as people. It is fundamental that despite all the propaganda to the contrary, people on both sides really are human and ought to be treated accordingly.'

Even if we leave compassion aside and calculate only the balance of risks, we are possibly not far from the greatest folly of all. The continuation and stepping up of this war can lead to a direct collision with China and her allies, and in turn to a nuclear war.

Thermo-nuclear War

Auschwitz and Belsen, Dresden and Hiroshima would be trifles compared with the harvest of thermo-nuclear weapons let loose upon the world. We would not get another stage past the obliteration bombing, past any logical military intention at all; since as President Eisenhower once said, in such a war there can be no victors, only losers. We would embark upon the mass extermination or human beings including the citizens of innocent neutral nations, because radioactivity knows no frontiers. We would set about the mutilation of generations never consulted, because not yet born.

New Zealand could contribute to this final atrocity and lunacy because our official defence policy is based on the possible use of nuclear weapons by our ally, the United States, on our behalf.

Officially we do not of course ever contemplate such a happening. We say that we never intend, and the United States never intends, to use these weapons in such a way. They are deterrents which warn off the enemy and keep the peace. We cannot however fail to admit that the deterrent will not work unless the enemy is persuaded that we would actually use it; and to persuade him, we have to keep it in a state of readiness for a crisis where we might have to use it. In brief, we have prepared our crematorium and we keep it in perfect order. Ours is a small share, but a clearly-defined share nevertheless.

Then why do we give our consent?

The reasons are many. Civilians, like generals, are bogged in perspectives of the last war. The realities of the nuclear age are not easy to grasp. Surely we are safer if we have the most modern weapons? What will happen to us if we do not? And then it is very difficult to agree about alternatives which are likely to work in our rapidly-changing world.

That is our collective problem. But there's the individual problem too. We don't want to lift our eyes to recognize the preparation of a crime; we don't want the labour and the heart-searching of getting at the truth, or the loneliness of crossing from the complacent majority to our anxious minority. And yet the first thing is to care, and to accept our share of the responsibility; to see that humanity won't survive unless we root out the lingering belief that some humans are less than human and can be treated in a sub-human way.

Hitler would never have gained control but for the acquiescence of those who never asked awkward questions. Most of them were humble folk without much imagination, going about their daily lives—like most of us. We do not expect every one to face up to

the perilous situation of the whole world. But we must—if there is to be even survival, let alone advancement—have enough people with the courage.

There is a play called *The Representative* in which the German writer Rolf Hochhuth penetrates this question of responsibility through probing the failure of Pope Pius XII to speak out against the Nazi extermination of the Jews. He adds this note to his postscript.²¹

'But how far can the neutral man be held guilty? Further—what can one expect of the neutral man when General Conscriptio and such statutes lead him into situations which are easier dealt with by saints than by men? A refusal to obey orders? How can any one demand such a thing from some one who has not, since his confirmation, even felt the need to reflect upon the problem of good and evil?

'However, the moment the individual is no longer to be held responsible for anything, either because he has nothing more to decide about, or because he does not grasp the fact that he has any obligation to decide, then an alibi has been created for all guilt. The play is over.'

References

- ¹ Christchurch Press, 20.8.65.
- ² Cyril Falls, *Armageddon*, pp. 175-6.
- ³ H. S. Gullett, *The Australian Forces in Sinai and Palestine*, extract printed in the Press 19.5.64.
- ⁴ *Christchurch Star* 20.5.64, quoting ex-trooper W. White of Dunedin.
- ⁵ Lieut.-Col. C. Guy Powles, *Official History of New Zealand's Effort in the Great War, Vol. III*, pp. 266-7.
- ⁶ P. M. S. Blackett, *Studies of War*, pp. 125-6.
- ⁷ David Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden*, Part III.
- ⁸ C. P. Snow, *Science and Government* (entire book); P. M. S. Blackett, op. cit., Part I, essays 8 and 9; Webster and Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive* (Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Vols. I and III.
- ⁹ Webster and Frankland, Vol. I, p. 324.
- ¹⁰ Ibid. Vol. I, p. 331.
- ¹¹ David Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden*, p. 50.
- ¹² Ibid. pp. 225-7.
- ¹³ Webster and Frankland, Vol. III, p. 112.
- ¹⁴ Press, 11.2.44, also Webster and Frankland Vol. III, p. 114. This official history bears out the general picture given by David Irving of the events in the British Parliament.
- ¹⁵ Press, 17.2.45.
- ¹⁶ P. M. S. Blackett, *Studies of War*, p. 125.
- ¹⁷ *Progress and Problems in South-east Asia*, an address in Tokyo 29.9.64, published by US Information Service.
- ¹⁸ *New Zealand Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam* (the White Paper), Dept. of External Affairs publication no. 314, 1965.
- ¹⁹ Statement by the president, Mr J. Yule of Carterton, Press 17.9.65.
- ²⁰ Press 30.9.65.
- ²¹ Rolf Hochhuth, *The Representative*, trans. Robert David, p. 331.

Scientist

Science in the Public Service

SOME TIME AGO I WROTE A SOMEWHAT CRITICAL NOTE ON science in the universities. In the interests of justice it seems fair to make some similar type of comment on public service scientists.

In New Zealand most scientific work is carried out by Public Servants. This work may be very broadly classified as advisory, service and research (pure and applied). In general the service scientist, the sort of person who does ana-

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